diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 5160b8b8..63cbd27d 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -412,10 +412,14 @@ AI 执行以下流程时，每一步都要向用户说明在做什么：
 
 只读权限的强制由各平台原生机制兜底；`config/limits.py` 的命令文本白名单（`_is_readonly_run_command_allowed`）只是**审批决策的启发式**，不再是安全边界（已知可绕过，如 `find . -delete`；绕过后果只是多走一次审批）。
 
-- **docker/web 模式 = 非特权 uid 执行角色**（`modules/docker_readonly_exec.py`）：
+- **docker/web 模式 = 非特权 uid 执行角色 + Landlock 进程级只读域**（`modules/docker_readonly_exec.py`）：
   - 容器主进程保持 root（可写执行不变）；`sandbox_write_access=False` 的执行通道（`terminal_ops/run.py`、`background_command_manager.py`、只读语境创建的持久终端）以 `-u 10001:10001` 运行，`DOCKER_READONLY_EXEC_UID/GID` 可覆盖
-  - 强制力 = 内核 DAC：工作区属主为宿主机 root，非属主无写权；600 权限文件（如 .env）不可读；逃逸需提权（setuid/内核漏洞），无 umount 类捷径
-  - 前提：工作区属主与该 uid 不碰撞、无 o+w 文件、容器未挂 docker.sock（云端已验证）；macOS Docker Desktop（virtiofs fakeowner）不执行 uid 权限，仅 Linux 宿主生效
+  - 第一层强制力 = 内核 DAC：工作区属主为宿主机 root，非属主无写权；600 权限文件（如 .env）不可读；逃逸需提权（setuid/内核漏洞），无 umount 类捷径
+  - **第二层 = Landlock 只读域**（2026-09 新增，云端实测 kernel 6.8 / ABI V4 / Docker 28 默认 seccomp 放行）：纯 DAC 的残留漏洞是工作区内历史遗留的 world-writable（777/o+w）路径对只读 uid 仍可写；只读执行时命令再经 `modules/landlock_launcher.py`（首次执行时 docker cp 进容器并自检）进入「工作区写类操作全拒」的内核域，最终权限 = DAC ∩ Landlock，该洞封死。要点：
+    - launcher 规则：handled 只含写类操作；ro 路径（工作区挂载点）不加规则（无覆盖即拒绝）；/tmp、/var/tmp、/dev/shm 显式授写权以对齐纯 DAC 现状行为（只读身份 HOME=/tmp）；读/执行不进 handled，仍由 DAC 管。注意不能写「/ 授全量 + ro 授空」的交集规则——空授权规则被内核拒绝（ENOMSG/errno 42）
+    - 自检失败（内核 <5.13 / seccomp 拦截 / 容器无 python3）自动降级纯 DAC，warning 日志标注 enforcement level；`DOCKER_READONLY_LANDLOCK=0` 可整体停用
+    - 语义边界：Landlock 不管 chmod/chown 等元数据修改，也不管未配置的网络——因此非特权 uid 层必须保留（root+Landlock 的进程可 chmod 放宽权限位让域外进程受益）
+  - 前提：工作区属主与该 uid 不碰撞、容器未挂 docker.sock（云端已验证）；macOS Docker Desktop 双重不适用（virtiofs fakeowner 不按 uid 检查；linuxkit 内核未编译 Landlock），仅 Linux 宿主生效
   - 持久终端在 readonly/approval/auto_approval 下同以只读身份创建（`terminal_readonly_enabled` 判定，`terminal_readonly_getter` 注入）；终端里的写入会被拒，写命令走 run_command 审批通道；权限跨界切换（受限档⇄unrestricted）时销毁现有终端会话重建（`_apply_restricted_execution_mode_link` → `close_all()`）
   - Dockerfile 创建 `agent` 用户 + `/etc/gitconfig` safe.directory + 去 setuid 加固；数字 uid 不依赖镜像内用户存在，旧镜像直接受益
 - **macOS 宿主机 = Seatbelt 白名单读模型**（`modules/host_sandbox_runner.py`）：
diff --git a/modules/background_command_manager.py b/modules/background_command_manager.py
index 9cc6ffc4..1d39fdd6 100644
--- a/modules/background_command_manager.py
+++ b/modules/background_command_manager.py
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from modules.host_sandbox_runner import (
     build_host_sandbox_readonly_plan,
     host_sandbox_enabled,
 )
-from modules.docker_readonly_exec import docker_readonly_exec_args
+from modules.docker_readonly_exec import docker_readonly_exec_args, docker_readonly_wrap_inner
 from modules.i18n import tr
 
 
@@ -225,9 +225,12 @@ class BackgroundCommandManager:
                 if relative:
                     container_workdir = f"{container_workdir}/{relative}"
                 exec_cmd = [docker_bin, "exec"]
+                inner_cmd = ["/bin/bash", "-lc", command]
                 if not sandbox_write_access:
                     # 只读执行：非特权 uid（内核 DAC 强制只读，见 modules/docker_readonly_exec.py）
                     exec_cmd += docker_readonly_exec_args()
+                    # Landlock 加固：可用时再以进程级只读域封住工作区写；失败自动降级纯 DAC。
+                    inner_cmd = docker_readonly_wrap_inner(container_name, mount_path, inner_cmd, docker_bin)
                 exec_cmd += [
                     "-e",
                     "PATH=/opt/agent-venv/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin",
@@ -236,9 +239,7 @@ class BackgroundCommandManager:
                     "-w",
                     container_workdir,
                     container_name,
-                    "/bin/bash",
-                    "-lc",
-                    command,
+                    *inner_cmd,
                 ]
                 use_shell = False
 
diff --git a/modules/docker_readonly_exec.py b/modules/docker_readonly_exec.py
index 6e3af2ad..2a79660c 100644
--- a/modules/docker_readonly_exec.py
+++ b/modules/docker_readonly_exec.py
@@ -19,11 +19,37 @@
   权限检查，本机制仅在 Linux 宿主机（云端/ Linux 桌面）生效，属预期差异；
   持久终端在 approval/auto_approval 模式下同为只读身份，写入命令请走
   run_command（审批通过后以 root 重跑）。
+
+Landlock 加固（2026-09 起）：
+
+- 纯 DAC 的残留漏洞：工作区内历史遗留的 world-writable（777/o+w）路径
+  对只读 uid 仍开放写权限。为此在只读执行时额外用 Landlock 给进程套上
+  「工作区写类操作全拒」的内核域（最终权限 = DAC ∩ Landlock），封死该洞。
+- launcher 为本目录 landlock_launcher.py，首次只读执行时 docker cp 进容器
+  并以只读身份自检（本进程+子进程写工作区都必须被拒），通过后才启用；
+  任何一步失败都静默降级为纯 DAC，并以 warning 日志标注 enforcement level。
+- 可用环境变量 DOCKER_READONLY_LANDLOCK=0 整体停用（运维逃生门）。
+- 语义刻意对齐纯 DAC 现状：仅工作区写类操作被拒，/tmp 等其余路径写、
+  全部读/执行行为不变（读保护仍由 DAC 承担）。
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import logging
 import os
-from typing import List, Tuple
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("docker_readonly_exec")
+
+LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().with_name("landlock_launcher.py")
+LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_CONTAINER_PATH = "/opt/astrion-landlock/launcher.py"
+
+# 容器名 -> "available" / "unavailable:<reason>"；None 表示尚未探测
+_landlock_states: Dict[str, str] = {}
+_landlock_states_lock = threading.Lock()
 
 
 def docker_readonly_uid_gid() -> Tuple[str, str]:
@@ -54,3 +80,105 @@ def docker_readonly_exec_args() -> List[str]:
         "-e", "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=safe.directory",
         "-e", "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=*",
     ]
+
+
+def _landlock_enabled() -> bool:
+    return os.environ.get("DOCKER_READONLY_LANDLOCK", "1").strip().lower() not in (
+        "0", "false", "off", "no",
+    )
+
+
+def _docker_run(docker_bin: str, args: List[str], timeout: int = 20) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        [docker_bin] + args, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout,
+    )
+
+
+def _deploy_and_selftest(container_name: str, mount_path: str,
+                         docker_bin: str) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
+    """把 launcher 部署进容器并以只读身份自检。返回 (是否可用, 失败原因)。"""
+    mount_path = (mount_path or "/workspace").rstrip("/") or "/"
+    try:
+        # 1. 容器内 python3 可用性
+        r = _docker_run(docker_bin, ["exec", container_name, "sh", "-c",
+                                     "command -v python3"], timeout=10)
+        if r.returncode != 0:
+            return False, "no-python3-in-container"
+        # 2. 部署 launcher 文件
+        r = _docker_run(docker_bin, ["exec", container_name, "mkdir", "-p",
+                                     os.path.dirname(LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_CONTAINER_PATH)],
+                        timeout=10)
+        if r.returncode != 0:
+            return False, f"mkdir-failed:{r.stderr.decode(errors='replace')[:200]}"
+        r = _docker_run(docker_bin, ["cp", str(LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_SRC),
+                                     f"{container_name}:{LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_CONTAINER_PATH}"],
+                        timeout=30)
+        if r.returncode != 0:
+            return False, f"docker-cp-failed:{r.stderr.decode(errors='replace')[:200]}"
+        # 3. 以只读身份自检（与真实只读执行同一 uid/环境）
+        r = _docker_run(
+            docker_bin,
+            ["exec", *docker_readonly_exec_args(), container_name,
+             "python3", LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_CONTAINER_PATH,
+             "--selftest", "--ro", mount_path],
+            timeout=30,
+        )
+        out = (r.stdout + r.stderr).decode(errors="replace")
+        # 4. 清理自检意外成功时的残留（此时说明 Landlock 未生效，但仍要扫尾）
+        try:
+            _docker_run(docker_bin, ["exec", container_name, "rm", "-f",
+                                     f"{mount_path}/.landlock_selftest_probe"],
+                        timeout=10)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        if r.returncode == 0 and "LANDLOCK_SELFTEST_OK" in out:
+            return True, ""
+        return False, f"selftest-failed:{out.strip()[:300]}"
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+        return False, "probe-timeout"
+    except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 - 部署探测必须兜底为降级而非异常
+        return False, f"{type(e).__name__}:{e}"
+
+
+def ensure_landlock_ready(container_name: str, mount_path: str,
+                          docker_bin: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
+    """确保容器内 Landlock 只读域可用（部署+自检，按容器缓存结果）。
+
+    任何失败都返回 False（调用方回退纯 DAC），不会抛出。
+    """
+    if not _landlock_enabled():
+        return False
+    with _landlock_states_lock:
+        state = _landlock_states.get(container_name)
+    if state is not None:
+        return state == "available"
+    docker_bin = docker_bin or shutil.which("docker") or "docker"
+    ok, reason = _deploy_and_selftest(container_name, mount_path, docker_bin)
+    with _landlock_states_lock:
+        _landlock_states[container_name] = "available" if ok else f"unavailable:{reason}"
+    if ok:
+        logger.info("landlock readonly ready: container=%s mount=%s",
+                    container_name, mount_path)
+    else:
+        logger.warning(
+            "landlock unavailable: container=%s reason=%s — "
+            "readonly enforcement falls back to DAC-only (world-writable "
+            "paths remain writable by the readonly uid)",
+            container_name, reason,
+        )
+    return ok
+
+
+def docker_readonly_wrap_inner(container_name: str, mount_path: str,
+                               inner_cmd: List[str],
+                               docker_bin: Optional[str] = None) -> List[str]:
+    """只读执行时包装容器内命令：Landlock 可用则经 launcher 进入只读域。
+
+    可用：  [python3, launcher, --ro, mount, --] + inner_cmd
+    不可用：原样返回 inner_cmd（纯 DAC 降级）。
+    """
+    if ensure_landlock_ready(container_name, mount_path, docker_bin):
+        mount = (mount_path or "/workspace").rstrip("/") or "/"
+        return ["python3", LANDLOCK_LAUNCHER_CONTAINER_PATH,
+                "--ro", mount, "--", *inner_cmd]
+    return list(inner_cmd)
diff --git a/modules/landlock_launcher.py b/modules/landlock_launcher.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eb0b753c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/landlock_launcher.py
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Astrion Landlock 只读域 launcher（容器内运行，非后端模块）。
+
+由后端 modules/docker_readonly_exec.py 部署到容器内（docker cp）并调用：
+
+    python3 launcher.py --ro /workspace -- <cmd> [args...]
+    python3 launcher.py --selftest --ro /workspace
+
+语义（2026-09 云端实测，kernel 6.8 / Landlock ABI V4 / Docker 28 默认 seccomp 放行）：
+
+- handled 集合只含写类操作（写文件/建删文件目录/创建设备节点/符号链接/
+  rename-link 跨越/截断），不授权的路径一律被内核拒绝；
+- ro 路径（通常即工作区挂载点）不加任何规则 → 写类操作全拒；
+- /tmp、/var/tmp、/dev/shm 显式授予写类权限 → 与纯 DAC 只读的历史行为对齐
+  （只读身份 HOME=/tmp，常见临时写入不受影响）；其余路径写权限收紧，这正是
+  要修复的 world-writable（777/o+w）绕 DAC 漏洞本身；
+- 读/执行不进入 handled 集合，完全交给 DAC（600 权限敏感文件仍不可读）；
+- 域随 fork/exec 继承且不可自行解除（配合 no_new_privs），子进程同受限。
+
+注：不能采用「/ 授全量 + ro 路径授空」的交集写法——landlock_add_rule 对
+allowed_access=0 的规则返回 ENOMSG（errno 42），内核拒绝空授权规则。
+
+仅依赖 python3 标准库（ctypes 直调 syscall），x86_64/aarch64 通用。
+"""
+import ctypes
+import os
+import sys
+
+libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
+
+PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 38
+
+# x86_64 与 aarch64 编号一致
+SYS_CREATE_RULESET = 444
+SYS_ADD_RULE = 445
+SYS_RESTRICT_SELF = 446
+
+LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1
+LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION = 1 << 0
+
+# access_fs 位（ABI V1 全集 + V2/V3 增量）
+FS_EXECUTE = 1 << 0
+FS_WRITE_FILE = 1 << 1
+FS_READ_FILE = 1 << 2
+FS_READ_DIR = 1 << 3
+FS_REMOVE_DIR = 1 << 4
+FS_REMOVE_FILE = 1 << 5
+FS_MAKE_CHAR = 1 << 6
+FS_MAKE_DIR = 1 << 7
+FS_MAKE_REG = 1 << 8
+FS_MAKE_SOCK = 1 << 9
+FS_MAKE_FIFO = 1 << 10
+FS_MAKE_BLOCK = 1 << 11
+FS_MAKE_SYM = 1 << 12
+FS_REFER = 1 << 13      # ABI V2：跨目录 rename/link
+FS_TRUNCATE = 1 << 14   # ABI V3：truncate(2)
+
+# 只读域要管的写类操作（读/执行刻意排除，留给 DAC 决定）
+WRITE_OPS_V1 = (FS_WRITE_FILE | FS_REMOVE_DIR | FS_REMOVE_FILE |
+                FS_MAKE_CHAR | FS_MAKE_DIR | FS_MAKE_REG | FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+                FS_MAKE_FIFO | FS_MAKE_BLOCK | FS_MAKE_SYM)
+
+
+class RulesetAttr(ctypes.Structure):
+    _fields_ = [("handled_access_fs", ctypes.c_uint64)]
+
+
+class PathBeneathAttr(ctypes.Structure):
+    _fields_ = [("allowed_access", ctypes.c_uint64),
+                ("parent_fd", ctypes.c_int32),
+                ("_pad", ctypes.c_int32)]
+
+
+def probe_abi() -> int:
+    """返回内核 Landlock ABI 版本（>=1），不支持/被拦返回 <1。"""
+    ctypes.set_errno(0)
+    ret = libc.syscall(SYS_CREATE_RULESET, None, 0,
+                       LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION, 0, 0, 0)
+    return ret
+
+
+def handled_for_abi(abi: int) -> int:
+    handled = WRITE_OPS_V1
+    if abi >= 2:
+        handled |= FS_REFER
+    if abi >= 3:
+        handled |= FS_TRUNCATE
+    return handled
+
+
+def install_readonly_domain(ro_paths, rw_paths=("/tmp", "/var/tmp", "/dev/shm")):
+    """安装只读域。成功返回 None，失败返回错误描述字符串。
+
+    ro_paths：写类操作全拒的路径（不加规则，靠「无覆盖即拒绝」生效）。
+    rw_paths：显式授予写类权限的路径（对齐纯 DAC 只读下的常用可写区）。
+    """
+    abi = probe_abi()
+    if abi < 1:
+        return f"kernel-unsupported(errno={ctypes.get_errno()})"
+    handled = handled_for_abi(abi)
+
+    attr = RulesetAttr(handled)
+    ctypes.set_errno(0)
+    ruleset_fd = libc.syscall(SYS_CREATE_RULESET, ctypes.byref(attr),
+                              ctypes.sizeof(attr), 0, 0, 0)
+    if ruleset_fd < 0:
+        e = ctypes.get_errno()
+        return f"create_ruleset(errno={e}:{os.strerror(e)})"
+
+    # 只给存在的 rw 路径加授权规则；ro 路径刻意不加规则（无覆盖 → 拒绝）
+    for path in rw_paths:
+        if not os.path.exists(path):
+            continue
+        try:
+            fd = os.open(path, os.O_PATH)
+        except OSError as e:
+            return f"open({path})(errno={e.errno}:{e.strerror})"
+        pba = PathBeneathAttr(handled, fd, 0)
+        ctypes.set_errno(0)
+        ret = libc.syscall(SYS_ADD_RULE, ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
+                           ctypes.byref(pba), 0, 0, 0)
+        os.close(fd)
+        if ret < 0:
+            e = ctypes.get_errno()
+            return f"add_rule({path})(errno={e}:{os.strerror(e)})"
+
+    if libc.prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0:
+        return "prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) failed"
+
+    ctypes.set_errno(0)
+    ret = libc.syscall(SYS_RESTRICT_SELF, ruleset_fd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+    if ret < 0:
+        e = ctypes.get_errno()
+        return f"restrict_self(errno={e}:{os.strerror(e)})"
+    return None
+
+
+def selftest(ro_paths) -> int:
+    """自检：安装域后本进程与子进程写 ro 路径都必须被拒。"""
+    err = install_readonly_domain(ro_paths)
+    if err:
+        print(f"SELFTEST_FAIL install: {err}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    probe = os.path.join(ro_paths[0], ".landlock_selftest_probe")
+    try:
+        with open(probe, "w") as f:
+            f.write("x")
+        print("SELFTEST_FAIL write-not-denied", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 3  # 残留文件由部署方以容器 root 清理
+    except OSError as e:
+        if e.errno != 13:  # EACCES
+            print(f"SELFTEST_FAIL unexpected errno={e.errno} ({e.strerror})",
+                  file=sys.stderr)
+            return 4
+    import subprocess
+    code = f"open({probe!r},'w').write('x')"
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True)
+    if r.returncode == 0:
+        print("SELFTEST_FAIL child-not-denied", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 5
+    # 白名单区（/tmp）必须仍可写，否则说明规则误配，会造成行为回归
+    try:
+        tmp_probe = f"/tmp/.landlock_selftest_rw.{os.getpid()}"
+        with open(tmp_probe, "w") as f:
+            f.write("x")
+        os.remove(tmp_probe)
+    except OSError as e:
+        print(f"SELFTEST_FAIL tmp-not-writable: errno={e.errno} ({e.strerror})",
+              file=sys.stderr)
+        return 6
+    print("LANDLOCK_SELFTEST_OK")
+    return 0
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    args = sys.argv[1:]
+    ro_paths = []
+    selftest_mode = False
+    cmd = []
+    i = 0
+    while i < len(args):
+        a = args[i]
+        if a == "--ro" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            ro_paths.append(os.path.normpath(args[i + 1]))
+            i += 2
+        elif a == "--selftest":
+            selftest_mode = True
+            i += 1
+        elif a == "--":
+            cmd = args[i + 1:]
+            break
+        else:
+            i += 1
+    if not ro_paths:
+        print("launcher: missing --ro <path>", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(2)
+    if selftest_mode:
+        sys.exit(selftest(ro_paths))
+    if not cmd:
+        print("launcher: missing command after --", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(2)
+    err = install_readonly_domain(ro_paths)
+    if err:
+        print(f"launcher: install readonly domain failed: {err}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(2)
+    os.execvp(cmd[0], cmd)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/modules/persistent_terminal/start.py b/modules/persistent_terminal/start.py
index 8b751fb6..335c3691 100644
--- a/modules/persistent_terminal/start.py
+++ b/modules/persistent_terminal/start.py
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ except ImportError:
         TERMINAL_SANDBOX_REQUIRE,
     )
 
-from modules.docker_readonly_exec import docker_readonly_exec_args, docker_readonly_uid_gid
+from modules.docker_readonly_exec import docker_readonly_exec_args, docker_readonly_uid_gid, docker_readonly_wrap_inner
 from modules.i18n import tr
 
 
@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ class StartMixin:
             "exec",
             "-i",
         ]
-        if self.sandbox_options.get("docker_readonly_exec"):
+        readonly_exec = bool(self.sandbox_options.get("docker_readonly_exec"))
+        if readonly_exec:
             # 只读身份会话：与 run_command 只读执行同一非特权 uid（内核 DAC 强制）
             cmd += docker_readonly_exec_args()
         if container_workdir:
@@ -284,10 +285,15 @@ class StartMixin:
         for key, value in envs.items():
             cmd += ["-e", f"{key}={value}"]
 
-        cmd.append(container_name)
-        cmd.append(shell_path)
+        inner_cmd = [shell_path]
         if shell_path.endswith("sh"):
-            cmd.append("-i")
+            inner_cmd.append("-i")
+        if readonly_exec:
+            # Landlock 加固：可用时 shell 及其子进程全程处于工作区只读域；失败自动降级纯 DAC。
+            inner_cmd = docker_readonly_wrap_inner(container_name, mount_path, inner_cmd, docker_path)
+
+        cmd.append(container_name)
+        cmd.extend(inner_cmd)
 
         env = os.environ.copy()
         process = subprocess.Popen(
diff --git a/modules/terminal_ops/run.py b/modules/terminal_ops/run.py
index e52ef9bb..783ce59d 100644
--- a/modules/terminal_ops/run.py
+++ b/modules/terminal_ops/run.py
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ from modules.host_sandbox_runner import (
     build_host_sandbox_readonly_plan,
     host_sandbox_enabled,
 )
-from modules.docker_readonly_exec import docker_readonly_exec_args
+from modules.docker_readonly_exec import docker_readonly_exec_args, docker_readonly_wrap_inner
 from modules.i18n import tr
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -187,9 +187,15 @@ class RunMixin:
                 if relative:
                     container_workdir = f"{container_workdir}/{relative}"
                 exec_cmd = [docker_bin, "exec"]
+                inner_cmd = ["/bin/bash", "-lc", command]
                 if not sandbox_write_access:
                     # 只读执行：非特权 uid（内核 DAC 强制只读，见 modules/docker_readonly_exec.py）
                     exec_cmd += docker_readonly_exec_args()
+                    # Landlock 加固：可用时再以进程级只读域封住工作区写（777/o+w 绕 DAC 的洞）；
+                    # 部署/自检有阻塞 docker 调用，放线程池；失败自动降级纯 DAC。
+                    inner_cmd = await asyncio.to_thread(
+                        docker_readonly_wrap_inner, container_name, mount_path, inner_cmd, docker_bin
+                    )
                 exec_cmd += [
                     "-e",
                     "PATH=/opt/agent-venv/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin",
@@ -198,9 +204,7 @@ class RunMixin:
                     "-w",
                     container_workdir,
                     container_name,
-                    "/bin/bash",
-                    "-lc",
-                    command,
+                    *inner_cmd,
                 ]
                 use_shell = False